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Abstract
We devise an abstraction of secure multi-party computations in the applied pi-calculus. Based
on this abstraction, we propose a methodology to mechanically analyze the security of crypto-
graphic protocols employing secure multi-party computations. We exemplify the applicability
of our framework by analyzing the SIMAP sugar-beet double auction protocol. We finally
study the computational soundness of our abstraction, proving that the analysis of protocols
expressed in the applied pi-calculus and based on our abstraction provides computational se-
curity guarantees.
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1 Introduction
Proofs of security protocols are known to be error-prone and security vulnerabilities have
accompanied academic protocols as well as carefully designed and widely deployed products
(e.g., Kerberos [10]). Hence work towards the automation of security proofs started soon after
the first protocols were developed. From the start, the actual cryptographic operations in such
proofs were idealized into so-called Dolev-Yao models [18]. This idealization simplifies proof
construction by freeing proofs from cryptographic details such as computational restrictions,
probabilistic behavior, and error probabilities. The work on the computational soundness of
Dolev-Yao models (e.g., [2, 7, 15, 14, 3])) has largely filled the gap between cryptographic
abstractions and computational cryptography, showing that security properties carry over
from the former to the latter.
While Dolev-Yao models traditionally comprise only non-interactive cryptographic op-
erations (i.e., cryptographic operations that produce a single message and do not involve
any form of communication, such as encryption and digital signatures), recent cryptographic
protocols rely on more sophisticated interactive primitives (i.e., cryptographic operations
that involve several message exchanges among parties), with unique features that go far
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beyond the traditional goals of cryptography to solely offer secrecy and authenticity of
communication.
Secure multi-party computation (SMPC) constitutes arguably one of the most prominent
and most amazing such primitive. Intuitively, in an SMPC, a number of parties P1, . . . , Pn
wish to securely compute the value F (d1, . . . , dn), for some well-known public function F ,
where each party Pi holds a private input di. This multi-party computation is considered
secure if it does not divulge any information about the private inputs to other parties; more
precisely, no party can learn more from the participation in the SMPC than she could learn
purely from the result of the computation already.
SMPC provides solutions to various real-life problems such as e-voting, private bidding and
auctions, secret sharing etc. The recent advent of efficient general-purpose implementations
(e.g., FairplayMP [8]) paves the way for the deployment of SMPC into modern cryptographic
protocols. Recently, the effectiveness of SMPC as a building block of large-scale and practical
applications has been demonstrated by the sugar-beet double auction that took place in
Denmark: The underlying cryptographic protocol [9], developed within the Secure Information
Management and Processing (SIMAP) project, is based on SMPC.
Given the complexity of SMPC and its role as a building block for larger cryptographic
protocols, it is important to develop abstraction techniques to reason about SMPC-based
cryptographic protocols and to offer support for the automated verification of their security.
Our contributions. The contribution of this paper is threefold:
We present an abstraction of SMPC within the applied pi-calculus [1]. This abstraction
consists of a process that receives the inputs from the parties involved in the protocol
over private channels, computes the result, and sends it to the parties again over private
channels, however augmented with certain details to enable computational soundness
results, see below. This abstraction can be used to model and reason about larger
cryptographic protocols that employ SMPC as a building block.
Building upon an existing type-checker [4], we propose an automated verification
technique for protocols based on our SMPC abstraction. We exemplify the applicability
of our framework by analyzing the sugar-beet double auction protocol proposed in [9].
We establish computational soundness results (in the sense of preservation of trace
properties) for protocols built upon our abstraction of SMPC. This computational sound-
ness result holds for SMPC that involve arbitrary arithmetic operations; moreover, it is
compositional, since the proof is parametric over the other (non-interactive) cryptographic
primitives used in the symbolic protocol and within the SMPC itself. Computational
soundness holds as long as these primitives are shown to be computationally sound
(e.g., in the CoSP framework [3]). We prove in particular the computational soundness
of a Dolev-Yao model with public-key encryption, signatures, and the aforementioned
arithmetic operations, leveraging and extending prior work in CoSP. Such a result allows
for soundly modelling and verifying many applications employing SMPC as a building
block, including the case studies considered in this paper.
Related work. Computational soundness was first shown by Abadi and Rogaway in [2]
for passive adversaries and symmetric encryption and later extended to active adversaries
and additional cryptographic primitives [2, 7, 15, 14, 3]. All these results, however, only
consider non-interactive cryptographic primitives, such as encryptions, signatures, and non-
interactive zero-knowledge proofs. To the best of our knowledge, our work presents the first
computational soundness proof for an interactive primitive.
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A salient approach for the abstraction of interactive cryptographic primitives is the
Universal Composability framework [11]. The central idea is to define and prove the security
of a protocol by comparison with an ideal trusted machine, called the ideal functionality.
Although this framework has proven a convenient tool for the modular design and verification
of cryptographic protocols, it is not suited to automation of security proofs, given the intricate
operational semantics of the UC framework and that ideal functionalities operate on bitstrings
(as opposed to symbolic terms). Dolev-Yao models (e.g., the applied pi-calculus) offer a
higher level of abstraction compared to ideal functionalities in the UC framework. Most
importantly, Dolev-Yao models enable automation of security proofs. The different degree
of abstraction in these models is best understood by considering digital signatures: While
computational soundness proofs for Dolev-Yao abstractions of digital signatures use standard
techniques [7, 15, 3] finding a sound ideal functionality for digital signatures has proven to
be quite intricate [16]. Yet, securely realizable ideal functionalities constitute a useful tool
for proving computational soundness of a Dolev-Yao model. Similarly to [12], we leverage a
UC realizability result for showing the computational soundness of our symbolic abstraction.
A generic symbolic abstraction of ideal functionalities has been proposed in [17]. In
that work it is shown that the different notions of simulatability, known in the literature,
collapse in the symbolic abstraction. In contrast to our approach, that work does not address
computational soundness guarantees and does not explicitly consider SMPC.
Outline. Section 2 reviews the applied pi-calculus and presents our SMPC abstraction.
Section 3 explains the technique used to statically analyze SMPC-based protocols and applies
it to our case study. Section 4 presents the computational implementation of a process and
studies the computational soundness of our abstraction and Section 5 concludes.
2 The symbolic abstraction of SMPC
In this section, we first review the syntax and the semantics of the calculus. We adopt a
variant of the applied pi-calculus with destructors [4]. After that, we present the symbolic
abstraction of secure multi-party computation within this calculus.
2.1 Review of the applied pi-calculus
We briefly review the syntax and the operational semantics of the applied pi-calculus, and
define the additional notation used in this paper.
Cryptographic messages are represented by terms. The set of terms (ranged over by
K, L, M , and N) is the free algebra built from names (a, b, c, m, n, and k), variables (x,
y, z, v, and w), and function symbols – also called constructors – applied to other terms
(f(M1, . . . ,Mk)). We let u range over both names and variables. We assume a signature
Σ, which is a set of function symbols, each with an arity. For instance, the signature may
contain the function symbols enc/3 of arity 3 and pk/1 of arity 1, representing ciphertexts
and public keys, respectively. The term enc(M, pk(K), L) represents the ciphertext obtained
by encrypting M with key pk(K) and randomness L. We let M denote an arbitrary sequence
M1, . . . ,Mn of terms. Destructors are partial functions that processes can apply to terms.
Applying a destructor d to terms M either succeeds and yields a term N (denoted as
d(M) = N), or it fails (denoted as d(M) = ⊥). For instance, we may use the dec destructor
with dec(enc(M, pk(K), L),K) = M to model decryption in a public-key encryption scheme.
Plain processes are defined as follows. The null process 0 does nothing and is usually
omitted from process specifications; νn.P generates a fresh name n and then behaves as P ;
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a(x).P receives a message N from channel a and then behaves as P{N/x}; a〈N 〉.P outputs
message N on channel a and then behaves as P ; P | Q executes P and Q in parallel; !P
behaves as an unbounded number of copies of P in parallel; let x = D then P else Q applies
if D = d(M) the destructor d to the terms M ; if application succeeds and produces the term
N (d(M) = N) or D equals a term N , then the process behaves as P{N/x}; otherwise, i.e.,
if d(M) = ⊥, the process behaves as Q.1
The scope of names and variables is delimited by restrictions, inputs, and lets. We write
fv(P ) for the free variables and fn(P ) for the free names in a process P . A term is ground if
it does not contain any variables. A process is closed if it does not have free variables. A
context C[•] is a process with a hole •. An evaluation context is a context whose hole is not
under a replication, a conditional, an input, or an output.
The operational semantics of the applied-pi calculus is defined in terms of structural
equivalence (≡) and internal reduction (→). Structural equivalence relates the processes
that are considered equivalent up to syntactic re-arrangement. Internal reduction defines the
semantics of process synchronizations and destructor applications. For more detail on the
syntax and semantics of the calculus, we refer to the full version [5].
Safety properties. Following [19], we decorate security-related protocol points with logical
predicates and express security requirements in terms of authorization policies. Formally, we
introduce two processes assume F and assert F , where F is a logical formula. Assumptions
and assertions do not have any computational significance and are solely used to express
security requirements. Intuitively, a process is safe if and only if all its assertions are entailed
by the active assumptions in every protocol execution.
I Definition 1 (Safety). A closed process P is safe if and only if for every F and Q such
that P →∗ νa.(assert F | Q), there exists an evaluation context E[•] = νb. • | Q′ such that
Q ≡ E[assume F1 | . . . | assume Fn], fn(F ) ∩ b = ∅, and we have that {F1, . . . , Fn} |= F .
A process is robustly safe if it is safe when run in parallel with an arbitrary opponent.
I Definition 2 (Opponent). A closed process is an opponent if it does not contain any assert.
I Definition 3 (Robust Safety). A closed process P is robustly safe if and only if P | O is
safe for every opponent O.
2.2 Abstracting SMPC in the applied pi-calculus
We recall that a secure multi-party computation is a protocol among parties P1, . . . , Pn to
jointly compute the result of a function F applied to arguments m1, . . . ,mn, where mi is a
private input provided by party Pi. More generally, not only a function but a reactive, stateful
computation is performed, which requires the participants to maintain a (synchronized) state.
At the end of the computation, each party should not learn more than the result (or, more
generally, a local view ri of the result). Since the overall protocol may involve several secure
multi-party computations, a session identifier sid is often used to link the private inputs to
the intended session. Coming up with an abstraction of SMPC that is amenable to automated
verification and that can be proven computationally sound is technically challenging, and it
required us to refine the abstraction based on insights that were gained in the soundness proof.
For the sake of exposition, we thus present simple, intuitive abstraction attempts of SMPC
1 Using a destuctor equal that checks term equality, we write if a = b then P else Q for
let equals(a, b) = a in P else Q.
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in the applied pi-calculus first, explain why these attempts do not allow for a computational
soundness result, and then successively refine them until we reach the final abstraction.
First attempt. A first, naive attempt to symbolically abstract SMPC in the applied
pi-calculus is to let parties send to each other the public information along with the en-
veloped private input on a private channel. This message can be represented by a term
smpc(F, i,m, sid), where i is the principal’s identifier. The abstraction then consists of a
destructor result whose semantics is defined by a rule like
result(mi, i, smpc(F , 1,m1, sid), . . . , smpc(F , n,mn, sid)) = pi(i,F(m1, . . . ,mn))
where pi(i, ·) denotes the projection on the i-th element. This abstraction is unsound: a
computational attacker (i) is capable of altering the delivery of messages, and (ii) learns
the session identifiers that occur in the header of each individual message. Our abstraction
attempt does not grant the adversary any such capabilities; hence a symbolic adversary is
much stronger constrained than a computational adversary, thus preventing computational
soundness results. These problems could be tackled by modifying the abstraction such that
all messages are sent and received over a public channel. The adversary would then decide
which parties receive which messages. The resulting abstraction, however, would not be
tight enough anymore: Corrupted symbolic parties could send different messages to the
participants, and hence cause them to compute the function F on different inputs. Such an
attack, however, is computationally excluded by a secure multi-party computation protocol.
Second attempt. Inspired by the ideal functionality paradigm [11], we solve the aforemen-
tioned problems by introducing a trusted party to whom every participant i sends its private
input and receives its own result in return over a private channel ini. A first attempt, called
SMPC temp, could look as follows:
SMPC temp
4= sidc(sid).in1(x1,= sid) . . . inn(xn,= sid).
let (y1, . . . , yn) = result(F , x1, . . . , xn) in in1〈y1, sid〉 . . . inn〈yn, sid〉
There still is discrepancy between this abstraction and the computational model that in-
validates computational soundness: a computational adversary learns the session identifier,
which is instead concealed by SMPC temp. In addition, the computation of F is shifted
to the evaluation of the destructor result. Such a complicated destructor would make
mechanized verification extremely difficult.
Final abstraction. To make the abstraction amenable to automated verification, in
particular type-checking, we represent F as a context that explicitly performs the computation.
The resulting abstraction of secure multi-party computation is depicted in Figure 1 as the
process SMPC. This process is parametrized by an adversary channel adv, a session identifier
channel sidc, n private channels ini for each of the n participants, and a context F . We
implicitly assume that private channels are authenticated such that only the ith participant
can send messages on channel ini. The computational implementation of SMPC implements
this authentication requirement. Furthermore, SMPC contains two restricted channels for
every party i: an internal loop channel inloopi and an internal input channel lini.
SMPC receives a session identifier over the channel sidc. Then n+ 1 subprocesses are
spawned: a process inputi for every participant i that is responsible for collecting the ith
input and for divulging public information, such as the session identifier, to the adversary,
and a process that performs the actual multi-party computation. Here inputi waits (under a
replication) on the loop channel inloopi for the trigger message sync() of the next round, and
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inputi
4= !inloopi(z).ini(xi, sid′).adv〈sid′〉.if sid = sid′
then lini〈xi〉 else inloopi〈sync()〉 | inloopi〈sync()〉
deliveri
4= ini〈yi, sid〉.inloopi〈sync()〉
SMPC(adv, sidc, in,F) 4= sidc(sid).νlin. νinloop.(
input1 | · · · | inputn | F [deliver1| · · · |delivern]
)
Figure 1 The process SMPC as the symbolic abstraction of SMPC
expects the private input xi and a session identifier sid
′ over ini. It then sends the session
identifier sid′ to the adversary, checks whether the session identifier sid′ equals sid, and
finally sends the private input xi on the internal input channel lini. The actual multi-party
computation is performed in the last subprocess: after the private inputs of the individual
parties are collected from the internal input channels lini, the actual program F is executed.
After each computation round, the subprocesses deliveri send the individual outputs
over the private channels ini to every participant i along with the session identifier sid. In
order to trigger the next round, sync() is sent over the internal loop channels inloopi.
The abstraction allows for a large class of functionalities F as described below.
I Definition 4. [SMPC-suited context] An SMPC-suited context is a context F such that:
1. fv(F) = {sid} and fn(F [0]) = {lin1, . . . , linn}.
2. Bound names and variables are distinct and different from free names and free variables.
Although one might expect additional constraints on the context F (e.g., it is terminating,
it does not contain replications, etc.), it turns out that such constraints are not necessary
as, intuitively, having more traces in the symbolic setting does not break computational
soundness. Such constraints would probably simplify the proof of computational soundness,
but they would make our abstraction less intuitive and less general.
Finally, we briefly describe how we model the corruption of the parties involved in the
secure multi-party computation. In this paper we consider static corruption scenarios, in
which the parties to be corrupted are selected before the computation starts. As usual in
the applied pi-calculus, we model corrupted parties by letting the adversary know the secret
inputs of the corrupted parties. This is achieved by letting the channel ini occur free in the
process if party i is corrupted. As we consider static corruption, we restrict our attention to
processes that do not send these channels ini over a public channel (see Section 4).
Arithmetics in the applied pi-calculus. One of the most common applications of SMPC
is the evaluation of arithmetic operations on secret inputs. Modelling arithmetic operations
in the applied pi-calculus is straightforward. We encode numbers in binary form via the
string0(M), string1(M), and nil() constructor applications. Arithmetic operations are
modelled as destructors. For instance, the greater-equal relation is defined by the destructor
ge(M1,M2), which returns M1 if M1 is greater equal then M2, M2 otherwise. With this
encoding, numbers and cryptographic messages are disjoint sets of values, which is crucial
for the soundness of our analysis and the computational soundness results.
The Millionaires problem. For the sake of illustration, we show how to express the
Millionaires problem in our formalism (two parties wish to determine who is richer, i.e., whose
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input is bigger, without divulging their inputs to each other.) The protocol is parametrized
by two numbers x1 and x2:
MP
4= νsid, sidc, c1, c2. adv〈sid〉. sidc〈sid〉 | SMPC(adv, sidc, c,F) | P1 | P2
Pi
4= ci〈(xi, idi), sid〉.ci(yi, sidi)
F [•] 4= lin1((x1, z1)).lin2((x2, z2)).let z = ge(x1, x2) then [y1 := z, y2 := z]•
where [y1 := z, y2 := z] denotes the instantiation of variables y1 and y2 with variable z, which
can be defined by encoding, and • is the hole of the context.
3 Formal verification
We propose a technique for formally verifying processes that use the symbolic abstraction
SMPC. In principle, our abstraction is amenable to several verification techniques for the
applied pi-calculus such as [19, 4]. In this paper, we rely on the type-checker for security
policies presented in [4], which we extend to support arithmetic operations. This type-checker
enforces the robust safety property (cf. the full version [5]).
We decorate the protocol linked to our SMPC abstraction with assumptions and assertions.
The assumptions are used to mark the inputs of the secure multi-party computation and to
specify the correctness property for the secure multi-party computation. The assertion is
used to check that the result of the SMPC fulfills the correctness property.
Specifically, for every party i an assumption assume Input(idi, xi, sid) is placed upon
sending a private input xi with session identifier sid, where idi is the (publicly known) identity
of party i. To check the correctness of the secure multi-party computation, assert P(z, sid)
is placed immediately after the reception of the result (z, sid). We also assume a security
policy, which takes in general the following form:
∀id, x, sid, z.( ∧ni=1 Input(idi, xi, sid) ∧
i,j∈[n]
idi 6= idj ∧ Frel
)⇒ P(z, sid)
The formula Frel characterizes the expected relation between the inputs and the output.
As an example, the policy and party annotations for the Millionaires problem would be as
follows:
∀id1, id2, x, y, sid.
( ∧
i∈{1,2}
Input(idi, x, sid) ∧ id1 6= id2 ∧ x ≥ y
)
⇒ Richer(id1, sid).
Pi
4= assume Input(idi, xi, sid) | ci〈(xi, idi), sid〉.ci(yi, sidi).assert Richer(yi, sid).
Arithmetics in the analysis. We extended the type-checker to support arithmetic opera-
tions. Specifically, we modelled arithmetic operations as predicates in the logic, defined their
semantics following the semantics given in the calculus, and added a few general properties,
such as the transitivity of the greater-equal relation. The type theory is extended to track
the arithmetic properties of terms (e.g., while typing let z = ge(x1, x2) then P , the type-
checker tracks that z is the greatest value between x1 and x2 and uses this information to
type P ). The type theory supports this kind of extensions as long as the set of added values
is disjoint from the set of cryptographic messages and the added destructors do not operate
on cryptographic terms, which holds true for our encoding of arithmetics.
Case study: sugar-beet double auction. As a case study for our symbolic abstraction,
we formalized and analyzed the sugar-beet double auction that has been realized within
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the SIMAP project by using an SMPC [9]. This protocol constitutes the first large scale
application of an SMPC. The double auction protocol determines a market clearing price for
sugar-beets. More specifically, first, a set of prices is fixed; then, for every price each producer
commits itself to an amount of sugar-beets that it is willing to sell, and each buyer commits
itself to the amounts of sugar-beets that it is willing to buy. The market clearing price is the
maximal market clearing price for which the supply did not yet exceed the demand.
Both the producers and the buyers might want to keep their bids secret. Hence, the private
input of every party has to be kept private. In the sugar-beet double auction developed by the
SIMAP project, the sellers and buyers perform a joint secure multi-party computation. The
producer and buyer parties send initially an input and receive at the end of the computation
the result, i.e., the market clearing price. In addition, before the start of the protocol,
producers and buyers receive a signature on the list of participants, the session identifier,
and the set of prices from a trusted party. This signature is verified by each participant
and sent as an input to the SMPC, which verifies the signatures and checks whether the
data coincides This ensures that all participants agree on the common public inputs. Notice
that this SMPC performs arithmetic operations as well as cryptographic operations, yet on
distinct values.
Finally, we are ready to state the policy characterizing the result of the computation that
is performed: the predicate MCP(z, sid) holds true if there are appropriate input predicates
Input(idi, xi, sid) and z is the maximal price for which demand is greater than or equal to the
supply, which we characterize by the predicate Is max(x1, . . . , xn, z) (the semantics of this
predicate is defined in terms of basic arithmetic operations supported by our type-checker).
∀z, sid, x1, . . . , xm, id1, . . . , idn.Input(id1, x1, sid) ∧ · · · ∧ Input(idn, xn, sid)∧
i,j∈[n]
idi 6= idj ∧ Is max(x1, . . . , xm, z)⇒ MCP(z, sid)
The verification of this policy is challenging in that our abstraction comprises about 1400
lines of code and it relies on complex functions. The type-checker succeeds in 5 minutes and
30 seconds for the SMPC process and the ceritifcation issuer and additional 40 seconds for
every participant. 2
4 Computational soundness of symbolic SMPC
In this section, we establish the computational soundness of our abstraction. We first
introduce the computational implementation of a process. Thereafter, we define the notion
of robust computational safety. Finally, we state the computational soundness results.
Our computational soundness result is parameterized over the symbolic model (D,P); this
symbolic model consists of a set of constructors and destructors D (modelling non-interactive
primitives such as encryption and decryption) and a class P of processes.
Computational execution of a process. The semantics of the applied pi-calculus is
purely symbolic (i.e., it does not involve probabilities, cryptographic messages are represented
as symbolic terms instead of bitstrings, the adversary is not computational, etc.). Along the
lines of [3], we introduce a probabilistic polynomial-time interactive Turing machine (ITM),
called the computational pi-execution, that interacts with a ppt ITM, called the adversary.
2 The source code can be found at http://www.lbs.cs.uni-saarland.de/publications/smpc_simap.
spi. We type checked the protocol with 2 prices, 3 computation parties, and 2 input parties.
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The computational pi-execution expects as input a process P and a security parameter k. We
summarize the main properties of this ITM. It enforces the reduction rules of the operational
semantics, draws a random bitstring for each fresh nonce (i.e., restricted name), and executes
each constructor and destructor application d(M) (for d ∈ D) as the computation of the
polynomial-time algorithm Ad on input M ; Ad is called the implementation of d and A is
the family of all implementations Ad (d ∈ D). In the operational semantics of the applied
pi-calculus, the reduction rules are non-deterministic. This non-determinism is resolved in
the implementation by letting the adversary select the reduction steps: The computational
execution sends the current process to the adversary and receives back a message indicating
the next instruction to be executed. Whenever the execution encounters an assert F , it
stores a tuple of the form (F1, . . . , Fn, F, η, µ, P ), called an assertion tuple, where Fi are the
active assumptions of the current process and η and µ are mappings assigning a bitstring to
each variable and name, respectively. We denote the interaction between the computational
pi-execution using the implementations A and an adversary Adv as ExecpiP,A,Adv(1k). Given
a polynomial p, the distribution of sequences of assertion tuples raised in an interaction of
ExecpiP,A,Adv(1k) within the first p(k) computation steps is denoted as AssertionspiP,A,p,Adv(k).
Our computational pi-execution is close in spirit to previously proposed computational
executions for the applied pi-calculus (e.g., [3]). Such an implementation, however, treats each
SMPC(adv, sidc, in,F) abstraction as a trusted host performing a computation and sharing
a private channel with each party, whereas the final implementation runs a distributed SMPC
protocol. We thus refine the computational pi-execution by letting the actual distributed
SMPC protocol be executed in place of the (implementation of the) SMPC(adv, sidc, in,F)
abstraction. The resulting computational execution ExecsmpcP,A,τ,Adv(1k), called computa-
tional SMPC-execution, is parameterized by the family τ of SMPC protocols implementing
each SMPC(adv, sidc, in,F) abstraction. AssertionssmpcP,A,τ,p,Adv(k) is defined analogous to
AssertionspiP,A,p,Adv(k) (see the full version [5] for the formal definitions).
Robust computational safety. The computational notion of robust safety depends on
the computational notion of logical entailment. A major difference between the standard
symbolic entailment relation and the computational entailment relation is that while the
former models destructor application tests d(M) = N via logical predicates of the form
Red(d#(M), N) (whose semantics follows from the symbolic rules of the applied pi-calculus),
the latter computationally checks Ad(M˜) = N˜ , M˜ and N˜ being the bitstrings computed
for M and N using η, µ, and A. Thus, we denote the computational entailment relation as
|=η,µ,A. We now introduce two definitions of robust computational safety, with respect to
Execpi and Execsmpc, respectively.
I Definition 5 (Robust computational safety). Let P be a process, A an implementation of
the destructors in P , and τ a family of secure multi-party computations. We say that P is
pi-(resp. SMPC-)robustly computationally safe using A (resp. A, τ) iff for all polynomial-
time interactive machines Adv and all polynomials p, Pr[for all ((F1, . . . , Fn), F, η, µ,Q) ∈ a,
{F1, . . . , Fn} |=η,µ,A F : a← AssertionspiP,A,p,Adv(k)] (resp. Pr[for all ((F1, . . . , Fn), F, η, µ,Q) ∈
a, {F1, . . . , Fn} |=η,µ,A F : a← AssertionssmpcP,A,τ,p,Adv(k)]) is overwhelming in k.
A symbolic model is computationally sound if robust safety carries over to the computational
setting. This definition is used in our first theorem, which is parameterized over the non-
interactive primitives used in the protocol.
I Definition 6 (Computationally sound model). Let A be a set of constructor and destructor
implementations. We say that a symbolic model (D,P) is computationally sound using A iff
for all P ∈ P such that P is robustly safe, P is pi-robustly computationally safe using A.
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There are properties for which computational soundness cannot be shown. For a function H
whose range is smaller than its domain (such as a collision-resistant hash function), consider
the injectivity property ∀x, y.x 6= y ⇒ H(x) 6= H(y). Symbolically, this property holds
true if H is a constructor. Computationally, however, this formula naturally does not hold
as x and y are universally quantified and collisions cannot be avoided. To exclude such
cases, we only consider quantification over protocol messages. This is formalized by requiring
that all quantified subformulas ∀x.F and ∃x.F are of the form ∀x.p(. . . , x, . . .) ⇒ F ′ and
∃x.p(. . . , x, . . .). ∧ F ′ (where p is a predicate) and we call the resulting class of first-order
formulas well-formed formulas (see the technical report [5] for a formal definition). Hence
∀x, y.x 6= y ⇒ H(x) 6= H(y) is not well-formed. Instead, ∀x, y.p(x)∧ p(y)∧x 6= y ⇒ H(x) 6=
H(y)3 (where p is a predicate, meant to be assumed upon reception of x and y) is well-formed.
As we exclude assumptions of the form ∀x.p(x), p(m) has to be assumed explicitly and m
must be a protocol message. For a collision-resistant hash function H, the above formula
holds computationally. We stress that in contrast to other computational soundness results
(e.g., [3]), where formulas are assumed to be term-free (i.e., contain nullary predicates only),
our result holds for formulas containing terms of the calculus and destructor application
tests.
In addition we require that (i) restricted channels ini are never output; (ii) session
identifiers are sent at most once on session identifier channels; and (iii) for all subpro-
cesses SMPC(adv, sidc, in,F) of P , the context F is SMPC-suited. Processes fulfilling
this constraints are called well-formed processes. A well-formed class of processes only
contains well-formed processes and enjoys some closeness properties, such as closeness under
subprocesses or top-level name restrictions (we refer to the full version [5] for more details).
Computational soundness of symbolic SMPC. We now state the main computational
soundness result of this work: the robust safety of a process using non-interactive primitives
and our SMPC abstraction carries over to the computational setting, as long as the non-
interactive primitives are computationally sound. This result ensures that the verification
technique from Section 3 provides computational safety guarantees. We stress that the
non-interactive primitives can be used both within the SMPC abstractions and within the
surrounding protocol. The proof uses a result from [13] on generic UC-realizable MPC
protocols that only holds under standard cryptographic assumptions: the setup assumption
of the CRS-model4 and the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations. Moreover, as also
required in [3], all implementations A have to be length-regular.
I Theorem 7 (Computational soundness of symbolic SMPC). Let (D,P) be computationally
sound, well-formed model using A, where A is length-regular. If enhanced trapdoor permuta-
tions exist, then there is a family ρ of SMPC implementations in the CRS-model such that
for each well-formed P ∈ P, the robust safety of P implies the SMPC-robust computational
safety of P using A, ρ.
Computational soundness of arithmetic operations. We show that our computational
soundness result applies to a large class of protocols by proving the computational soundness
of a symbolic model with public-key encryption, signatures, and arithmetics5. We recall that
3 This formula is logically equivalent to ∀x.p(x)⇒ ∀y.p(y)⇒ x 6= y ⇒ H(x) 6= H(y). For the sake of
a clear presentation, the policies in Section 3 are not well-formed, but adding for every quantified
variable x a predicate p(x) to the premise makes these policies well-formed as well.
4 More precisely, in each SMPC session all parties have access to a shared bitstring, called the CRS.
5 This result extends prior work [3] in the CoSP framework to arithmetics and first-order logic formulas.
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numbers are modelled as symbolic bitstrings and arithmetic operations as destructors on these
bitstrings. In this way, we enforce a strict separation between numbers and cryptographic
terms, such as signatures and keys. Thus, it is not possible to apply an arithmetic operation
on nonces, signatures, or encrypted messages. Due to this separation, the impossibility result
for computational soundness of XOR [6] does not apply. As in [3], we impose some standard
conditions on protocols to ensure that all encryptions and signatures are produced using fresh
randomness and that secret keys are not sent around. A protocol satisfying these conditions
is called key-safe. We denote the resulting symbolic model as (DESA,PESA).
The computational soundness proof for (DESA,PESA) follows almost exactly the lines of
the symbolic model for key-safe protocols in the work of Backes, Hofheinz, and Unruh [3].
The proof can be found in the full version [5].
I Theorem 8 (Computational soundness of (DESA,PESA)). If enhanced trapdoor permutations
exist, there is an length-regular implementation A such that (DESA,PESA) is a computationally
sound, well-formed model.
As a corollary of Section 7 and Theorem 8, we get the computational soundness of protocols
using SMPC, public-key encryption, signatures, and arithmetics, with such non-interactive
cryptographic primitives possibly used within both SMPC and the surrounding protocol.
I Corollary 9 (SMPC computational soundness with (DESA,PESA)). There is an implementation
A and a family of UC-protocols τ such that for each well-formed P ∈ PESA, the robust safety
of P implies the SMPC-robust computational safety of P using A and τ .
5 Conclusion
We have presented an abstraction of SMPC in the applied pi-calculus. We have shown that
the security of protocols based on this abstraction can be automatically verified using a
type system, and we have established computational soundness results for this abstraction
including SMPC that involve arbirtrary arithmetic operations. This is the first work to
tackle the abstraction, verification, and computational soundness of protocols based on an
interactive cryptographic primitive.
Our framework allows for the verification of protocols incorporating SMPC as a building
block. In particular, the type-checker ensures that the inputs provided by the participants to
the SMPC are well-formed and, after verifying the correctness of SMPC, the type-checker
obtains a characterization of the outputs (e.g., in the Millionaires problem, the output is
the identity of the participant providing the greatest input) that can be used to establish
global properties of the overall protocol. Our framework is general and covers SMPC based
on arithmetic operations as well as on cryptographic primitives.
This work focuses on trace properties, which include authenticity, integrity, authorization
policies, and weak secrecy (i.e., the attacker cannot compute a certain value)6. As a future
work, we plan to extend our framework to observational equivalence relations, possibly
building on recent results for a fragment of the applied pi-calculus [14]. It would be interesting
to formulate and verify an indistinguishability-based secrecy property for SMPC. This task is
particularly challenging since the result of an SMPC typically reveals some information about
the secret inputs and standard secrecy definitions based on observational equivalence are
6 To symbolically model weak secrecy, one can add the process c(x).if x=n then assert false (where c
is a public channel) to check the secrecy of n: The protocol is robustly safe only if the attacker does
not learn n.
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thus too restrictive. An additional problem is the computational soundness of observational
equivalence for processes with private channels, which are excluded in [14] but are needed in
our abstraction and, arguably, in any reasonable SMPC abstraction.
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